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First of all, I would like to thank the HKIMR and BIS for giving me an opportunity to attend 
this very important conference. I should start with the usual disclaimer. The view I am about 
to express is my own and not necessarily that of the Bank of Korea. 
Professors Park and Kim have given us a quite comprehensive explanation on the Korean 
monetary policy system, its operation, performance and tasks. I would like to say in advance 
that I agree with many of the main findings of this paper. I will by and large not argue with the 
empirical findings except a few minor points, although I have some reservations on the 
conclusion. Having said that, I would like to start section by section. 
In Sections I and II, I think the history of monetary policy implementation and the policy 
system of the Bank of Korea are well described in a objective manner. However, I would like 
to point out two things. First, the authors argue that “the expansionary monetary policy since 
2000 has not been effective in bringing about economic recovery”. In my opinion, however, 
while the expansionary monetary policy did not bring about a noticeable economic recovery, 
it did prevent business activities from sliding into a deeper slump. In a small open economy 
like Korea, it is typical that the demand management policy has limitations, especially during 
the course of an economic downturn arising from external shocks. While monetary policy is 
inevitably in a passive stance, its role to support economic activities should not be 
downgraded. Therefore, I think the monetary policy played its own expected role in that 
sense, in a rapidly changing economic environment involving various domestic and overseas 
shocks. I will come back to this point later. 
My second point is about the date of full adoption of inflation targeting in Korea. The paper 
argues that in Korea pure inflation targeting was established in 2003, but it is fair to say that 
the complete transition to inflation targeting in Korea was made in 2001, when the monetary 
indicator M3 was no longer set as an intermediate target. This view is consistent with a paper 
by the IMF in 2005, where the monetary policy system of Korea has been classified as fully 
fledged inflation targeting since 2001. 
The empirical analyses in Sections III and IV of the paper seem to give positive assessments 
of the performance of inflation targeting of Korea, after its introduction in 1998. Inflation 
targeting in Korea can be evaluated as successful in the sense that it has contributed greatly 
to price stability. The annual rate of increase in headline CPI inflation has stabilised at 
around 3%, as against 7.5% in 1998. Since 2002, core inflation has been held stable within a 
band of between 2.9% and 3.1%, a good match for the 3% midpoint of its current target 
range. Also, as shown by the paper, the volatility and persistence of inflation decreased after 
the adoption of inflation targeting, implying that there has been some enhancement of the 
credibility of monetary policy operations. 
Concerning the interpretation of the results of the reaction function estimation in Section IV, I 
agree with the authors that the BOK has taken a flexible inflation targeting approach. While 
the Bank of Korea takes price stability as the primary objective of monetary policy as the 
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Bank of Korea Act stipulates it, it also appreciates the reduction of short-term economic 
fluctuations and the stability of financial markets as policy goals. When these goals were 
moving in mutually contradictory directions, the BOK placed its focus on the objectives that it 
considers most important under prevailing situations, as long as price stability is not 
hampered. This is called employing a flexible approach. For instance, four cuts of the call 
rate target were implemented in 2003 and 2004 to promote economic recovery. In 
October  2005, however, the Bank of Korea raised the call rate target. It was the BOK’s 
intention to shift the focus of policy to control potential inflation pressure in the medium term, 
as signs of the economic recovery emerged. 
Meanwhile, financial stability has become another important objective of monetary policy. 
Financial development and stability are essential constituents of sustainable economic 
growth. While an advanced and stable financial system enhances the efficiency of the 
distribution of resources and bolsters economic development, financial instability can trigger 
serious economic crises. Furthermore, considering the fact that the effects of monetary policy 
are transmitted to production activities and prices through the financial sector, if the financial 
markets suffer from instability or do not function properly, then the transmission channel of 
monetary policy will not work smoothly. In this regard, the Bank of Korea also strives to 
achieve financial stability in the actual operation of its policy, although it is not specified as 
such in the Bank of Korea Act.  
The evaluations of the transmission channels of monetary policy look mixed in Section V of 
the paper. There are merely differing views as to whether different channels work as well as 
the policy authorities expect. The transmission mechanism of monetary policy has not 
worked very well for an extended period in Korea, primarily due to episodes of financial 
instability and the inappropriate financial infrastructure.  
After the adoption of an inflation targeting framework, the Korean economy suffered from the 
impact of the financial crisis of 1997-98, the financial collapse of Daewoo business group 
(September 1999), the severe financial difficulties of Hyundai business group (May 2000) 
and Hynix (May 2001), 9/11 terror (September 2001), the war in Iraq (October 2002), 
geopolitical risks related to North Korea (December 2002), a credit card boom and bust, and 
financial difficulties of major credit card companies (March 2003). All of these have 
contributed to destabilising financial markets and the Korean economy. 
But one thing I want to point out is that notwithstanding turbulence in the economy and 
extraordinary volatility in the financial markets, empirical studies, which are based on 
variance decomposition analysis of a six-variable (overnight short-term interest rate, long-
term interest rate, exchange rate, stock price, industrial production, and CPI) VAR model, 
show that the effects of monetary policy on inflation have been enhanced since the adoption 
of the inflation targeting framework. 
Finally, on the conclusion, I agree with the first point that there were other factors which 
contributed to price stability, including a lack of domestic demand, the appreciation of the 
Korean won against the US dollar, modest wage increases, the decline of international prices 
of imported goods, etc.  
However, the paper seems to reach somewhat pessimistic conclusions about future 
prospects for the Bank of Korea’s monetary policy and inflation targeting system. These 
conclusions seem to stem from concerns that tightening policy, when incorporated in a policy 
mix with foreign exchange rate policy, may not be sufficiently effective in times when 
monetary tightening is needed. One area where I disagree with the authors is on the 
assertion that the BOK might have a two-anchor monetary policy system or intermediate 
exchange rate regime. Since Korea’s adoption of the free floating exchange rate system in 
December 1997, evaluation of its exchange rate operations has shown that, on the whole, 
application of market mechanisms for exchange rate determination has been enhanced in 
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On the other hand, some economists, including the authors of the paper, have expressed 
negative views on the policy perspective behind exchange rate operations, arguing that the 
authorities still have a fear of floating because of sharp exchange rate fluctuations. As a 
rationale for this argument, they point to: (i) the limited extent of exchange rate volatility; 
(ii) suspicions that the Korean authorities target a certain level of exchange rate to ensure 
export price competitiveness. 
Notwithstanding these arguments, it is clear that the authorities in Korea have maintained the 
principle that the exchange rate should be determined in the market through the interaction 
of the demand for and supply of foreign exchange. Foreign exchange market intervention is 
implemented not to target a certain level but to smooth radical changes in the exchange rate 
when there is a transient external shock or a bid-offer gap due to one-sided exchange rate 
expectations. 
As for the first rationale behind the pessimistic views, the fact of the matter is that won/dollar 
exchange rate volatility has increased significantly since adoption of the free floating system. 
That is, the daily ex post volatilities measured by the differences between each day’s and 
each previous day’s closing rates and between the daily highs and lows have both more than 
doubled compared to the period before introduction of the free floating system. 
The second assertion that the Korean authorities have actively intervened in the market to 
target an exchange rate sustainable for maintaining price competitiveness is not 
unambiguous. The nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) indices show that since 1998 
changes in yearly averages have been widening to 5.3%, from 2.0% during the periods 
before the currency crisis.  
In 2003 and 2004, the figures represent a stable pattern, implying that the Korean won has 
kept pace with the movements of other currencies. Similarly, the yearly changes in the real 
effective exchange rate (REER) indices have also increased since adoption of the free 
floating system, from 2% to 5.2%, while the won has appreciated slightly compared to other 
currencies since 2002. These figures may imply that the won has not been operated for the 
purpose of targeting a specific exchange rate level, but that its value has instead been 
determined in the market, reflecting the global trends of major currencies. 
The new monetary policy environment has come about with the complete opening of the 
financial market and the introduction of a free floating exchange rate regime. When there are 
changes in exchange rates between major currencies or in the pattern of foreign investors’ 
stock investment, prices which are the most important variable for monetary policy will be 
affected by changes in the exchange rate of the won. In the case of the small open economy, 
the exchange rate is likely to be not so much adjusted endogenously as given exogenously. 
Accordingly, the central bank is forced to take a passive stance. Specifically, the BOK is 
obliged to change its monetary policy stance when the exchange rate is not in balance with 
the inflation target.  
In closing, I would like to point out some tasks ahead. Above all, I think that various efforts 
should be continuously made to ensure effectiveness of the inflation targeting system. While 
the Bank’s monetary policy operation has indeed advanced in terms of its system and 
practices, there are several new challenges and difficulties, and coping with them involves 
important tasks. The first of these that should be pointed out is that of heightening the Bank’s 
economic forecasting capacity. The Bank of Korea forecasts GDP growth and inflation with 
fan-charts to take account of forecasting uncertainty. However, individual economic agents’ 
demand for more sophisticated forecasting has been growing in Korea recently. In order to 
satisfy that demand as well, greater effort to increase the accuracy of forecasting is also 
needed.  
The second major task is to enhance the communication channel between the financial 
markets and the BOK. The central bank should make an effort to gather financial market 
reactions and improve public understanding of its monetary policy by explaining its policies 
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Congress twice a year, and recently started to publish the minutes of the Monetary Policy 
Committee with a six-week lag on the website. In this way, I believe the accountability and 
transparency of monetary policy operation in Korea has increased substantially.  
Lastly, we should set the transmission mechanism of monetary policy to rights and maintain 
it constantly by, for example, nurturing the development of the money and capital markets.  
Thank you for your attention. 